In Industrial Maintenance Engineers v Webster Miller Ltd [2026] EWHC 393, HHJ Bird, sitting as a judge of the High Court, provided helpful guidance of the approach to be taken when determining whether a defendant should be entitled to withdraw from an admission of liability.
On 2 December 2021, whilst unloading in the claimant’s warehouse, the defendant’s driver caused structural damage. The claimant sought damages for the losses incurred. The defendant was responsible for the acts of its driver and had the benefit of insurance through GLI.
The defendant’s broker, Wrightsure, notified the claim to GLI. On 13 December 2021 GLI emailed the finance manager of the claimant company saying the file had been passed to him to “progress forward to settlement”. He gave the finance manager the option of providing more detail about the cost of the required work or to accept a without prejudice offer of settlement. The finance manager rejected the offer and explained that they were obtaining estimates of the work. On 5 January 2022 GLI emailed the finance manager stating, “to confirm the insurer has advised that liability is accepted, though I am struggling to get through to our Contracts Manager, so will aim to revert back to you in the morning”.
On 17 March 2022 GLI made an interim payment of £173,500 to the claimant without any reservation of rights. Then, on 5 April 2022, GLI declined cover to the defendant on the grounds that equipment was not being used on a road or highway, or in a public space.
The claimant issued proceedings on 24 August 2024 and relied on the wording of the admission as binding under CPR 14.1. The defendant filed a defence denying liability, alternatively alleging contributory negligence. It argued various points including:
On 15 January 2025, the defendant issued a Part 20 claim against GLI so they would be covered. That claim was settled on confidential terms and GLI took over conduct of the defence.
The claimant issued an application for summary judgment against the defendant, who then issued a cross application to withdraw its admission on 8 October 2025.
HHJ Bird summarised the two main questions as:
a. Did the relevant admission of liability bind both the defendant insurer and the defendant?
b. If so, should the defendant be permitted to withdraw the admission?
On the application for summary judgment, HHJ Bird felt the claimant would be unable to satisfy the court and that there was no real prospect of the defence succeeding. “Real” meant “more than fanciful”.
Before deciding the substantive issues, HHJ Bird explained that five relevant questions arose:
The judge found that the email plainly amounted to an admission of liability. The words used had to be given their ordinary meaning and interpreted objectively.
He also found that the admission included the issue of contributory negligence. It was plain that any argument about this would require an in-depth examination of the facts surrounding the relevant incident. The specific allegations pleaded on contributory negligence advanced a full defence of the claim. It was impossible to see how a trial of contributory negligence would avoid dealing with a full exploration of the circumstances of the incident and liability. It followed that if contributory negligence allegations were to be pursued, the liability admission would necessarily have to be withdrawn. The court was satisfied that this issue was also compromised within the wording of the admission.
Next the judge considered that the email admission was not made on a without prejudice basis. He accepted that there were circumstances in which correspondence could be treated as without prejudice even if not marked expressly as such. There had been some specific without prejudice correspondence on 13 December 2021 which made an offer, but that offer was rejected. The email of 5 January 2022 was not a resurrection of those negotiations. It simply dealt with the admission of liability.
As to which version of CPR Part 14 applied, the judge confirmed it was common ground that under the old pre-October 2023 version an admission could be withdrawn without the need to seek the court’s permission. The claimant argued that the change to CPR Part 14 brought about a substantive and not merely procedural change of law. Following the case of Yewbon Tew [1983] AC533 the test now to be applied regarding the withdrawal of an admission was whether retrospective withdrawal “would impair existing rights and obligations”. HHJ Bird rejected this argument.
Claimant counsel also relied on the case of Walley v Stoke on Trent City Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1137 to argue that a party seeking to withdraw from an admission of liability needed to show that it would not “affect the fairness of the trial”. Again, the judge rejected the argument.
On the first question of whether the relevant admission bound both the defendant and his insurers, HHJ Bird found that it plainly did. GLI took over conduct of the claim and made the admission. The making of the admission would be empty if the defendant insured was simply able to say that it was not bound by what its insurer had said.
On the question of whether the admission should be withdrawn, HHJ followed the factors identified in CPR Part 14.5:
The judge did not consider it was appropriate to permit the withdrawal of the admission. The admission made by the insurer should be treated as the admission of the defendant. It was not made in error, and the claimant had every reason to treat it as an admission made properly by an experienced professional person after appropriate discussion. For all the reasons identified HHJ Bird refused permission to withdraw the admission and granted summary judgment on liability to the claimant.
In cases where a defendant has made a plain admission of liability and not sought to withdraw it within relatively early course, and where no new evidence has come to light, it is likely that the court will be slow to accede to any request for a later withdrawal. Conversely, if a defendant can show that an admission was made in certain circumstances, that subsequent evidence has come to light that materially changes prospects of success, and there is an application made at the earliest possible stage, the court may be more sympathetic.
Ultimately there will be a balancing of the likely prejudice to the parties as to the effects the withdrawal would have in accordance with the overriding objective.


The service you deliver is integral to the success of your business. With the right technology, we can help you to heighten your customer experience, improve underwriting performance, and streamline processes.