Município de Mariana and others v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 1319
In a judgment handed down on 12 November 2026, the Court of Appeal upheld an award of pre-judgment interest on costs at 1% above the Bank of England base rate for claimants funded via Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs).
Sir Geoffrey Vos MR confirmed that CPR 44.2(6)(g) confers a broad compensatory discretion. A party does not need to have paid invoices upfront or taken out a commercial loan to recover pre-judgment interest. A contingent liability to compensate solicitors for providing legal services on credit (such as a CFA success fee) triggers the discretion.
In Município de Mariana and others v BHP Group (UK) Ltd and another [2026] EWCA Civ 1319, the Court of Appeal held that the English courts have jurisdiction under CPR 44.2(6)(g) to award pre-judgment interest on costs to claimants funded via Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs), even when those claimants have paid nothing upfront toward their legal fees.
CPR 40.8 states,
‘(1) Where interest is payable on a judgment pursuant to section 17 of the Judgments Act 18381 or section 74 of the County Courts Act 19842, the interest shall begin to run from the date that judgment is given unless –
(a) a rule in another Part or a practice direction makes different provision; or
(b) the court orders otherwise.
(2) The court may order that interest shall begin to run from a date before the date that judgment is given.’
CPR 44.2 (6) states,
‘The orders which the court may make under this rule include an order that a party must pay –
(g) interest on costs from or until a certain date, including a date before judgment.’
Following a major liability trial regarding the 2015 Fundão Dam collapse, O’Farrell J ordered BHP to pay 90% of the claimants’ Stage 1 costs, a £43 million payment on account, and pre-judgment interest at 1% above the UK base rate.
Each of the 450,000 or so claimants were represented under a CFA with their solicitor backed by a third-party corporate debt facility. The claimants incurred no upfront fees and only faced liability for base and success fees upon obtaining an agreement to pay or an award of damages. In relation to this eventuality, the judge said at para 51,
‘… the claimants will be liable to pay success fees to their legal representatives reflecting the costs of funding the litigation, thereby reducing any damages received.
It is a liability for costs, albeit a contingent liability at this stage.
As a matter of principle, the claimants should be entitled to compensation in respect of the funding expenses for which they will be indebted out of any damages.’
BHP appealed solely on the interest award, arguing that CPR 44.2(6)(g) requires direct out-of-pocket loss and that awarding interest on deferred CFA costs circumvented the statutory prohibition on recovering success fees under section 58A(6) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (citing Hirachand v Hirachand).
BHP accepted that success fees payable under CFAs will generally involve an element of compensation for funding costs by solicitors. The MR said,
‘In my judgment, therefore, we are able to assume that the success fees in this case are intended, at least in part, to compensate the claimants’ solicitors for the funding costs they have incurred in providing legal services to the claimants without cost.’
The issue on appeal was whether the discretion can be exercised in favour of a party who is liable to compensate someone else for the fact that legal services have been provided to them on credit.
Vos MR said,
‘It was clear in this case, and will be clear in many cases, that the receiving parties were obliged to provide compensation for the time value of the money used to fund their costs. In this case, that obligation was, as the judge said at [51], through payment of the success fee: “reflecting the costs of funding the litigation, thereby reducing any damages received”.’
Vos MR held,
‘Accordingly, in my judgment, the power in CPR Part 44.2(6)(g) provides a broad discretion to compensate for the loss of the time value of money, which is for the purpose of compensating the receiving party either for having been kept out of its money or for itself being liable to compensate someone else (whether the solicitors providing the legal services themselves, an insurer or a third-party funder) for the fact that legal services have been provided on credit.’
What does this mean for paying parties?
Claimants may be able to recover pre-judgment interest from the date costs were incurred even if they paid nothing during the litigation and did not personally take out a formal loan. Standard CFA arrangements where solicitors carry work on credit may suffice.
What can we expect to see?
We expect to see a significant increase in claimants seeking an order that the defendant pay interest on costs.
Interest rates of 4%+ above the Bank of England base rate are likely to be claimed from the midpoint date that period costs were incurred to the date of the Costs Order and statutory interest under the Judgments Act 1838 at 8% per annum running thereafter.
Payments on account of costs
We recommend making early payments on account of costs. A payment will not extinguish a claim for pre-judgment interest altogether, but it directly affects how interest is calculated, when it stops running on the paid portion, and how the court exercises its discretion over the remaining balance.
Once a payment on account is actually received, interest stops running on the paid sum from the date of receipt, leaving interest to accrue solely on the unpaid balance pending detailed assessment.
Depending on the individual circumstances of a case, pre-judgment interest applications can be successfully opposed, and the rate and period of pre-judgment interest can be reduced.
Matthew Luckhurst - Lead Lawyer
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