The High Court’s decision in KHX v Isle of Wight Council [2026] EWHC 1949 (KB) is one of the first reported authorities to consider the effect of the new limitation provisions introduced by the Crime and Policing Act 2026 in relation to child sexual abuse claims – namely, sections 11ZA and 11ZB of the Limitation Act 1980.
The case is significant for:
The claimant alleged that while resident in a local authority children’s home during the 1980s he was subjected to physical abuse by a residential care worker, Mr Bucket, and sexual abuse by a residential care worker, Ms Moorse.
The local authority accepted that if abuse were established, it would be vicariously liable for the acts of both employees. The allegations were first reported to police in 1998, but civil proceedings were not commenced until October 2024.
The defendant did not rely upon limitation in respect of the sexual abuse allegations, accepting that they fell within the new statutory scheme under section 11ZA and did not seek dismissal of the claim based upon the new “fair hearing” test under section 11ZB. However, it maintained a limitation defence in respect of the physical abuse allegations.
The claimant advanced an argument that because the proceedings included allegations of child sexual abuse, the new limitation regime should apply to the entirety of the action, including allegations of physical abuse. The argument relied heavily on Parliament’s use of the word “action” within section 11ZA. The claimant contended that once a claim included child sexual abuse allegations, all causes of action within those proceedings should benefit from the removal of limitation.
The court rejected this submission. The court held that section 11ZA must be read as a whole. While the section refers to an “action”, it only applies where the claimant’s injuries are attributable to conduct constituting sexual abuse. Physical assault allegations cannot be transformed into child sexual abuse claims merely because they appear in the same proceedings.
It therefore remains that child sexual abuse allegations will fall within section 11ZA, but non-sexual abuse claims remain subject to sections 11 and 33.
Having determined that section 11ZA did not apply to the physical abuse allegations, the court then considered whether the limitation period should be disapplied under section 33. The factual position strongly favoured a refusal to disapply because the primary limitation period expired in 1995, proceedings were issued approximately 29 years out of time, and the alleged abuse occurred almost 40 years before trial. Further, Mr Bucket died before trial.
The judge accepted there was substantial forensic prejudice. Memories had faded, records were incomplete, and the defendant had lost the ability to call and test evidence from the alleged perpetrator.
However, the court concluded that these factors did not make the trial unfair. The allegations had been reported to police in 1998, a police investigation had been undertaken, and substantial records survived. Consequently, the court considered there remained sufficient material to evaluate the claim fairly. The limitation period was therefore disapplied under section 33.
Although no formal application was pursued under section 11ZB, the judgment contains some observations. Section 11ZB provides that a child sexual abuse claim must be dismissed if the defendant proves that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place. The defendant chose not to invoke section 11ZB in relation to the sexual abuse allegations, it appears on the basis that Ms Moorse was still alive and able to attend trial to give evidence. Accordingly, the court did not have to make a formal ruling on whether a fair hearing remained possible.
Nonetheless, throughout the judgment reference was made to the existence of surviving police investigations, notes and other documentary records, as well as the availability of key witnesses, and the court’s ability to assess credibility and reliability which meant that a fair hearing was likely to have been deemed possible
Despite overcoming the limitation hurdle on the physical abuse claim and facing no limitation defence on the sexual abuse claim, the claimant ultimately failed on liability.
The court accepted that the allegations were longstanding and the claimant had reported abuse many years before commencing litigation and that the claimant genuinely believed his account. However, the judge drew an important distinction between sincerity and reliability.
The court identified concerns regarding the evolution of allegations over time, differences between police statements and trial evidence, and allegations that emerged only in later accounts. The judge ultimately concluded that there was insufficient confidence in the reliability of the claimant’s evidence to find either physical or sexual abuse proved on the balance of probabilities. Both claims were therefore dismissed.
This is an early decision on the post-2026 limitation landscape. The judgment confirms that the abolition of limitation for child sexual abuse claims does not extend to separate physical abuse allegations. Ultimately, the claimant’s case failed not because limitation barred the claims (as the alleged abuser in respect of the sexual abuse allegations was still alive), but because the court was not satisfied that the allegations had been proved on the evidence. It therefore remains that physical abuse claims ought to be subject to the limitation challenges presented by section 33 and the decision in AB & Others, and that defendants should continue to plead limitation in respect of physical abuse and other non-sexual abuse allegations notwithstanding the limitation reform.
However, this decision does not reference or seem to take into account the views of Mr Justice Irwin in AB and Others v The Nugent Care Society [2009] EWHC 481. This decision focused not on whether a fair hearing was possible, but whether a claimant who alleged physical assault had a justifiable explanation for their delay. In AB & Others, even where there were relevant convictions for physical abuse, the court said it would not be reasonable or proportionate to be expected to try such allegations of a purely physical nature after the expiry of the limitation period. Mr Justice Irwin stated that there is “no significant inhibitory factor produced” by physical abuse and “excessive punishment could not possibly be thought to carry the same stigma as sexual abuse, or to bring in its train the same inhibition from reporting, addressing or discussing what took place”.
Further, the difference in this case is that the claimant made allegations of both physical and sexual abuse. The court therefore appears to have treated both the physical and sexual abuse allegations together on the issue whether the claimant had a reasonable explanation for not pursuing the allegations sooner, i.e. the claimant would not be expected to have reported his allegations of physical abuse sooner than his allegations of sexual abuse. However, this ignores the fact the court had already determined that the physical abuse allegations are subject to a separate limitation regime and are a separate cause of action. The effect of this means that if allegations of physical and sexual abuse are made in the same claim, despite separate limitation regimes applying to each cause of action, a claimant could inadvertently benefit from the new limitation regime for child sexual abuse when being required to explain their delay in respect of the physical abuse allegations.
No doubt there will be further cases before the court to address these issues and the determination of the application of the new limitation regime.
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